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ABSTRACT 
This study assessed the role of trade liberalization on the formal-informal sector of Nigeria. It 
examined whether or not the trade liberalization process have any effect on both the reduction in 
the wage differential between registered and non-registered (roughly formal and informal) workers 
and the decrease in the proportion of registered workers. The study used both secondary and 
primary data via the administration of questionnaires to discuss the channels through which trade 
liberalization could affect these two variables and put forward an empirical approach to test the 
existence of any correlation between them. The results from the study revealed that the fall in the 
wage gap between registered and non-registered workers in the manufacturing sector was affected 
by trade-related variables, particularly, by the import penetration ratio. However, the study did not 
find robust evidence that trade liberalization had a substantial effect on the decrease in the 
proportion of registered workers. 
Keywords: Trade Liberalization, Registered and Non-registered workers, Manufacturing Sector. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One thing that is common with several middle-income developing countries such as Botswana, 
Nigeria, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the undertaking of several 
structural reforms, particularly trade liberalization reforms. Many recent studies have tried to assess 
the impact of these reforms on the labour market of these countries. Basically, researchers have 
looked for evidences of any of the Hecksher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson (HOSS) framework’s 
implications in developing country labour markets. Aleman-Castilla (2006) and Bosch et al. (2007) 
have looked for evidence that trade liberalization has triggered the following sequence of events: 
(1) increases in the relative price of unskilled intensive products/firms/industries; (2) a positive 
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effect of these price increases on the demand for unskilled workers; (3) a reduction in the wage 
premium of skilled workers, leading to lower wage inequality in these countries and finally (4) an 
increase in the share of skilled workers in all sectors due to the increase in the relative price of 
unskilled workers.  
Besides this interest on the distributional consequences of trade liberalization based on the 
HOS framework, Avirgan et al. (2005) and Bairagya (2010) have also tried to measure the impact 
of trade liberalization on employment and on the wage structure as a way to assess the importance 
of rent-sharing in the protected sectors. Despite these numerous studies on the impact of trade 
liberalization on developing country labour markets, some pertinent questions remain to be 
explored. Behrman (1999) and Gonzaga et al. (2002) examined the impact of trade liberalization on 
the “informal” manufacturing sector and the existence of possible spillover effects on the rest of the 
economy. This is important because if dual labour markets are important in developing countries, 
then to overlook the implications of trade liberalization for the wage differential between “formal” 
and “informal” workers (Behrman, 1999; Gonzaga et al., 2002), and on their mobility pattern may 
yield an incomplete description of its impact on the entire labour market. The wage structure in 
Nigeria’s informal sector is difficult to get but we relied on the data sourced primarily. 
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap from the empirical literature using the Nigerian 
trade liberalization experience as a quasi-natural experiment. From literature, it is obvious that 
there is a wide disparity between employees’ wages in the formal and informal sectors; this is due 
to the fact that informal businesses are not registered so they are not regulated by the government 
authorities. We assess whether trade liberalization can be considered a serious factor to explain 
both the fall in the wage differential between registered (formal) and non-registered (informal) 
workers, and the fall in the proportion of registered workers in the economy. The incident of trade 
liberalization in Nigeria is particularly interesting for this task because it implied a huge fall in 
tariff and non-tariff barriers and it occurred during a short period of time, basically within three 
years. Besides, the schedule of tariff reduction announced in 1990 was brought forward several 
times, making a strong case for the exogeneity of the trade reforms. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, the evolution and description of the proportion 
of registered workers and of the wage gap between registered and nonregistered workers in the 
manufacturing sector during 1980 to 2010 will be done. Second, literature on the impact of the 
trade liberalization on the labour market of developing countries, and the channels through which 
trade liberalization could affect both the wage differential between registered and non-registered 
workers and the proportion of registered workers will be discussed. Third, the paper puts forward a 
procedure to identify whether or not trade liberalization had any impact on the fall in the wage 
differential between registered and non-registered workers and on the increase of the proportion of 
non-registered workers. This procedure is based on exploiting industry variation of trade-related 
measures such as effective tariffs, import penetration and export orientation ratios for a panel of 10 
tradable manufacturing industries. 
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2. REGISTERED AND NON-REGISTERED WORKERS IN THE 
MANUFACTURING    SECTOR IN NIGERIA 
The proportion of non-registered workers increased – at least, for non-farming activities – and 
the wage differential between the two groups diminished during the 1990s. The proportion of non-
registered workers increased from 30 percent in 1981 to about 60 percent in 2008, and the bulk of 
this increase was concentrated after 1990, just after the country started the market-oriented reforms, 
such as the programmes of privatization and the process of trade liberalization. While the 
proportion of non-registered workers increased, the raw wage gap between registered and non-
registered workers fell between 1981 and 2008. In 1981, the raw ratio of log real hourly-wage 
between registered and non-registered workers was 1.08, but in 2008 it was down to 0.71. As non-
registered workers are less likely to be found in the manufacturing sector, one could associate the 
fall in the proportion of registered workers with the reduction in the number of workers in the 
manufacturing sector. A lower proportion of “manufacturing jobs” would lead to a higher 
proportion of non-registered jobs in the whole economy (Adewuyi, 2006). 
 
2.2 The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Developing Country Labour Market 
The Hecksher-Ohlin theorem states that a country will tend to export goods that are relatively 
intensive in the abundant factor. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows that changes in the output 
price have a more than proportional effect on the return of the relatively abundant factor in the 
industry where the shock occurred. The combination of these two theorems yields the prediction 
that trade policy changes that lead to a higher relative price of unskilled-intensive goods should 
bring about an increase in the relative wage of unskilled workers. Assuming the special case where 
the functional form of the production functions for all sectors and for the aggregate utility function 
is Cobb-Douglas, the proportional change in the relative wage rate between skilled workers (s) and 
unskilled workers (u) in an open economy can be expressed as: 
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where β1 and β2 are the proportion of skilled workers in the skilled-intensive sector and in the 
unskilled-intensive sector, respectively;  A1 and  A2 are technology parameters in these same 
sectors, and  P1 and  P2 the respective product prices. Since β1 > β2 changes in prices and/or 
technology have a more than proportional effect on changes in the relative wage, an increase in  P2, 
the price of the product in the unskilled-intensive sector, should lead to a more than proportional 
fall in the relative wage of the skilled workers. However, the above result only holds if we assume 
that: (1) the economy is small so that it cannot affect the international price of the product, which is 
assumed to be exogenous, (2) the economy is inside the cone of diversification, meaning that 
tradable goods intensive in both factors, skilled and unskilled labour, are produced in that 
economy; (3) there is no product differentiation, i.e., foreign and domestic goods are perfect 
substitutes; and (4) there are no mobility barriers for workers to respond to wage changes. A 
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corollary of this theory is that changes in the supply of different factors do not alter their relative 
prices (as changes in the relative price do). Changes in the factor endowment of a country would 
increase the production in the industries intensive in the factor, without altering its relative price 
(Johnson and Stafford, 1999). So far the empirical literature on the developing countries has found 
at best mixed results regarding HOS predictions.  
For the Mexican experience in the mid-1980s, Hanson and Harrison (1999) show that the 
reduction in tariff protection unreasonably affected low-skilled industries, contrary to what one 
would expect for a developing country. This is so, because the Mexican import substitution strategy 
extended trade protection preferentially to industries that made relatively intensive use of unskilled 
labour. The relative higher protection of industries in which the countries would, in principle, have 
comparative advantage was also noticed by Currie and Harrison (1997) for the Moroccan 
manufacturing sector. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) also found that the structure of tariff protection 
benefited more the industries with a higher share of unskilled workers in Colombia and in Brazil. 
These studies highlight the necessity to understand the previous structure of protection before 
assuming that any trade liberalization reform would trigger a reduction in wage inequality, as 
measured by the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers. If the protected sectors were 
the ones in which the country already had comparative advantage, then the openness measures 
could lead to a fall in their product prices and then trigger an increase in the relative demand for the 
scarce factor (skilled workers).  
Behrman et al. (2001) do not find evidence that trade liberalization has any overall widening 
effect on wage differentials for a panel of 18 Latin American countries - including Brazil - for the 
period 1977 to 1998. The reason ascribed for this is inaccessibility to all the data needed for the 
variables used in the study. Robbins (1996a) did not find any relationship between trade 
liberalization and wage inequality for Colombia. Robbins and Gindling (2001) find evidences 
consistent with a positive correlation between trade liberalization and higher returns to education in 
Chile. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2001) find that manufacturing sectors where the import penetration 
increased the most, wage inequality also widened relatively more in favour of the most skilled 
workers in Argentina.  
According to Pavcnik et al. (2002), they showed that the increase in the return of the college-
educated workers coincides with the trade liberalization in Brazil. They do not find any relationship 
between trade related measures and the increase in wage premium in sectors more affected by the 
reform, but they do find that the sector specific skill premium did rise for skilled workers. Green et 
al. (2001) also stress the coincidence between trade liberalization in Brazil and the increase in the 
relative wage of college-educated workers, but fail to find any causal relationship. Unlike Pavcnik 
et al. (2002), however, they do find that the wage premium increased in sectors more affected by 
the trade reform. Dickerson et al. (2001) using a pseudo panel approach find that the returns on 
education for college-educated workers fell after the trade liberalization in Brazil, but do not find 
any correlation between trade measures and the return on education for college workers. Note that 
this result contradicts Green et al. (2001). This is so due to the fact that the pseudo-cohort approach 
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adopted by Dickerson et al. (2001) points to an overestimation of the returns on education yielded 
by the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method employed by Green et al. (2001). Arbache et al. 
(2004) reinforce the results in Green et al. (2001) and argue that within the traded sector, increasing 
openness was associated with lower wages but the downward impact of openness on wages was 
insignificant at the highest two education groups.  
Gonzaga et al. (2002) in a study carried out in Brazil, argued that the wage differential 
between skilled and non-skilled workers fell after trade liberalization and that the mechanism of 
transmission of this fall through tariff to prices and prices to wages is in line with HOSS 
predictions. The lack of strong evidence for HOSS implications in developing countries has been 
rationalized via three hypotheses. The first is related to the perception that developing countries 
with higher proportion of semi-skilled workers may have been suffering strong competition from 
countries with a higher proportion of unskilled workers (Wood, 1997; Hanson and Harrison, 1999). 
This halfway position of some industrialized developing countries, mainly in Latin America, would 
prevent HOSS framework from working. The second hypothesis assumes that trade may have 
caused a higher contact with leading-edge technology. In order to install this newly available 
technology, firms might have demanded more skilled workers to operate them and to adapt the 
production process to this more efficient technology. Such reasoning is advocated by the skill-
enhancing trade hypothesis due to capital-skill complementarity (Robbins, 1996b) and by the 
learning-by-trade hypothesis (Pissarides, 1997).  
The third hypothesis argues that empirical studies fail to find any HOSS trade related impact 
on income distribution because of global/pervasive skill biased technological change (Berman and 
Machin, 2000). In this case, no correlation between trade measures and the increase in the premium 
of skilled workers would be observed, since this would be an economy-wide phenomenon. A 
second point that has been emphasized in the literature is the role of trade liberalization in changing 
institutional features of industrial relations and then indirectly affecting the wage and employment 
structure (mainly in the manufacturing sector) of countries that have undertaken trade reforms. The 
main hypothesis has to do with the loss of union power triggered by trade reforms. Both the fall of 
trade barriers and tariff reductions increase the price elasticity of product demand, hence reducing 
rents that sustained the union wage premium. We will briefly report some results of empirical 
studies on the impact of trade reforms on relative wages. Driffill et al. (1998) showed that when 
non-tariff barriers were reduced in Britain, the wages in the relevant establishments fell 
significantly Revenga (1992) observed a similar effect associated with falls in import prices in the 
United States of America. Lang (1998) argued that the small effect of trade liberalization in New 
Zealand on the composition of employment suggested that the effect of tariffs on wages and firms’ 
monopoly power, reducing both of them, eliminated any effect on the distribution of employment.  
Borjas and Ramey (1995) showed that the impact of international trade on relative wages 
(skilled/unskilled wages) depends on the market structure of the industry affected. They argued that 
many industries producing durable goods in the United States of America in the 1980s that 
employed a disproportionate share of less educated workers were highly concentrated, earned 
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significant rents, and shared those rents with their workers by paying them higher-than-average 
wages. Their empirical evidence shows that employment changes in a small group of trade-
impacted concentrated industries can explain not only part of the aggregate rise in wage inequality 
in the United States of America, but also some of the differences in trends in wage inequality 
across metropolitan areas. Somewhat against those findings, Johnson and Stafford (1999) in their 
review of the impact of trade on labour market institutions argued that despite the theoretical 
negative relationship between increased international competition and “monopoly rents” enjoyed 
by the firms protected in the past, there is no strong evidence of a negative effect of increased trade 
on unionism either in the United States of America or in the United Kingdom. 
The findings on the impact of trade-related variables on wages and on employment for 
developing countries also tend to place this sort of rent-sharing argument as a possible explanation 
for decreases in the average wage, at least, in the manufacturing sector. Arbache (1999) argues that 
the marked-oriented reforms in Brazil, and particularly trade liberalization, led to a higher demand 
for skilled workers that ended up increasing union power. This happened because unlike developed 
countries, the unionized workers are relatively more educated in Brazil than non-unionized 
workers. Revenga (1997) finds evidences that the (negative) impact of trade liberalisation on wages 
in Mexico was higher than the (negative) effect on employment. She argued that this fact may be 
explained by the prevalence of rent-sharing schemes in the period previous to trade liberalization. 
Such schemes would have allowed unions and firms to agree in cutting “excessive wages” rather 
than adjusting the employment margin after the reforms. Similarly, Currie and Harrison (1997) 
analyzing the Moroccan trade liberalization argue that in an imperfect competitive framework 
where some rents were captured by workers in the form of higher wages, firms could also respond 
to their rent loss by cutting wages and substituting temporary workers for permanent ones. 
Menezes-Filho and Arbache (2002) show evidences of rent-sharing for unionized workers in the 
manufacturing sector in Brazil. However, they also find that the increase in quasi-rents brought 
about by trade liberalization was not shared with unionized workers. 
 
2.3 Trade Liberalization and the Segmented Labour Market 
The impact of trade liberalization on the informal sector is less understood and less 
documented. Behrman (1999) pointed out that most studies focused on the impact of trade 
liberalization on the formal manufacturing sector, but less is known about its effect on the informal 
sector, both in the manufacturing sector17 and in the entire labour market. In this section, we will 
highlight possible effects of trade liberalization on segmentation – in terms of the registered versus 
non-registered classification – in Brazil. The first thing to notice about the relationship between 
trade liberalization and the relative wage of registered and non-registered workers is that such a 
classification is an institutional feature and not a skill-based classification. Unlike the 
classifications by educational attainment; occupational categories; production and non-production 
workers as traditionally used in the literature and that are based on productivity related features; the 
classification between registered and non-registered workers parallels the classifications between 
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union/non-union workers and/or temporary/permanent workers, which are much more related to 
institutional features of the labour market. The second thing to notice is that the informal sector has 
been traditionally linked to the non-tradable sector, leading to the view that the informal sector 
would not be affected directly by trade liberalization. The presence of a non-tradable sector where 
non-registered status is prevalent, however, would not affect the predictions according to the model 
we presented in the last section, that is, the world prices of goods 1 and 2 would still determine the 
relative wage as in equation (1). Nevertheless, the presence of a non-tradable sector with such 
characteristic would make the cone of diversification of that country thinner, and more likely that a 
fall in the relative price of the “non-registered” prevalent good would lead that industry to close 
down so that non-registered workers would be employed only in the non-tradable sector (Johnson 
and Stafford, 1999). In this case, equation (1) would no longer represent the skilled/unskilled (or 
registered/nonregistered) wage rate. The relative wage would be determined as in the case of a 
closed economy:  
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where the subscript 4 stands for the non-tradable sector 4, which is “non-registered” prevalent 
and unskilled intensive. It is clear from equation (2) that regardless of the changes in prices in the 
tradable sector, the relative wage would be unaffected. In this context, one should not expect to find 
any effect of trade-related variables on the relative wage of skilled/unskilled workers or 
registered/non-registered workers.  
Midway situations between the result of the closed model represented by equation (2) and the 
open model in equation (1) arise if one assumes that: a) domestic and foreign goods are not 
perfectly substitutes and b) labour types cannot move in response to wage changes (Johnson and 
Stafford, 1999). In fact, some commentators have used the tradable versus non-tradable approach to 
explain the dichotomy between formal versus informal sector in Nigeria. The idea behind this 
correspondence is that the earnings of workers in the informal (non-tradable sector) is determined 
by supply and demand in that sector, whereas the earnings of workers in the formal sector is 
determined by the external demand for the export goods. The demand for the national 
manufactured product would be lower after the trade reform due to the access to cheaper products, 
whereas the non-tradable sector would be protected from that competition. The difficulty in such 
argument is how to justify the lack of mobility between workers from the formal to the informal 
sector. It could be argued that the informal sector would act as a cushion for workers displaced 
from the tradable sector, leading to a downward pressure on wages in that sector. Therefore, it is 
not clear how trade liberalization would affect the wage of the employees in the tradable sector, but 
would not affect the wage of the employees in the non-tradable sector. 
This sort of argument would be more justifiable in a context of imperfect competition where 
one would focus on the effect of trade reforms on institutional features of developing country 
labour markets. In this framework, trade reform would squeeze rents that would have been captured 
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by protected firms and shared with their employees. As seen above, if the protected firms were the 
ones abundant in the scarce factor (skilled labour) then one should expect under HOS assumptions 
that the reduction or elimination of trade barriers would reallocate resources to the now more 
competitive firms based on the abundant factor and hence increase the demand for unskilled labour. 
However, as many authors have shown this is not necessarily the case, and the protected sector may 
have been in fact the one that had a higher proportion of the abundant factor. Alternatively, if the 
protected sector cannot be characterized as perfectly competitive, then there is space for some sort 
of rent sharing. Therefore, workers in most affected industries would experience a reduction in 
their bargaining power –and so in their wages - since the ground for rent sharing would be reduced. 
Assuming that the most protected sectors are the ones with a higher proportion of registered 
workers, or where registered workers profit more from rents thanks to the market power of their 
firms, one should observe a reduction in the wage premium for registered workers after the 
reforms.  
In Nigeria, registered workers are more likely to be unionized and to work in large firms, 
which are more likely to have market power and therefore to have some loss due to trade 
liberalization.  
Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that the degree of segmentation, as measured by 
the wage premium for registered workers, is positively correlated with trade protection measures. 
The process of trade liberalization should hence curb the wage differential between registered and 
non-registered workers. Besides this direct effect, skilled workers displaced from registered jobs 
may have joined the pool of non-registered workers, increasing their average skill level and 
contributing to the reduction in the wage differential due to changes in the composition of the two 
groups.  
So far, we have focused on wage differential, but as mentioned above, trade liberalization can 
also affect the allocation of different type of workers between and within industries. In particular, 
Nigerian firms may have reacted to the trade liberalization shock not only by substituting non-
registered workers for registered workers, but also sub-contracting part of the tasks that they could 
have performed earlier in an attempt to reduce costs. The reallocation of part of the production to 
smaller firms may have led to a higher participation of the non-registered workers in the pool of 
manufacturing employee. Similarly, the reduction in absolute terms of the number of jobs in the 
manufacturing sector due to adjustments in the size and composition of its workforce may have led 
to an increase in the proportion of nonregistered workers in the entire economy. Most of these 
channels are hard to assess since there is no available and compatible data on “informal firms” in 
Brazil that would allow one to compare its performance over the recent period with the 
performance of medium to large firms.  
Data from the Brazilian annual household survey (PNAD) shows that the proportion of non-
registered workers increased in the manufacturing sector from 15 percent to 24 percent from 1981 
to 2008, which is a clear indication of a possible lower degree of compliance within the 
manufacturing sector. Furthermore the proportion of workers in small firms (up to ten employees) 
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increased from 40 percent to 50 percent in the entire economy and from 15 percent to 23 percent in 
the manufacturing sector during the same period. These changes may have two causes: (a) more 
firms decided to contract workers illegally; (b) the balance on the birth and death of firms favoured 
smaller firms that are more likely to employ non-registered workers. Somewhat supporting this 
latter hypothesis, Muendler (2001), based on an unbalanced panel of medium to large size 
manufacturing firms, finds that in the period 1992-1998, the probability of transition from active 
status to extinct (shut down), and from suspended to extinct had increased considerably in 
comparison to the period 1986-1990. This evidence lends some support to the argument that there 
was a cleanup effect among medium to large firms after trade liberalization that may have led to a 
reduction in the proportion of registered workers.  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Model Specification 
To test whether or not trade liberalization had any impact on the fall in the wage differential 
between the registered and non-registered workers and on the increase in the proportion of the non-
registered workers in the pool of manufacturing employees between 1981 and 2008, we run a 
fixed-effect model for both the coefficient of the “registered worker” dummy variable obtained 
from a standard semi-log Mincerian wage equation and the proportion of registered workers on a 
set of variables related to trade: effective tariff, nominal tariff, import penetration ratio and export 
orientation for a panel of 10 industries. The industry classification was developed in order to make 
the data from the household survey compatible with the trade-related data used in this paper. The 
sample is restricted to employed individuals between 14 and 65 years old with positive earnings 
and who worked more than 20 hours per week. In the case of the effect of trade openness measures 
on the wage differential, we first estimate the following log wage equation for each pair of industry 
j and year t separately between 1981 and 2008. The time frame is due to the fact that trade 
liberalization policies were implemented from the 1980s. 
    
              Reijt jt jt ijt jt ijt ijtw X g      ----------------------------------------------- (3) 
where wijt is the log of the real hourly-wage for the individual i in industry j and year t and Γ is 
a vector of coefficients of the following independent variables X: region, gender, education (6 
groups), experience, experience squared and metropolitan area, and βjt is the coefficient for the 
dummy variable Reg that indicates whether the individual is a registered worker. In a second step, 
we regress the estimate coefficient βjt on the trade-related variables: 
 
           jt jt j t jtTM          --------------------------------------------------------- (4) 
where; TMjt stands for trade measure variables in period j and time t and ϕj are industry 
dummies and θt are time period dummies and εjt is assumed to be a white noise. The second 
reduced-form estimates refer to the impact of trade-related measures on the proportion of registered 
workers in the industries: 
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         2Pr jt jt j t jteg TM         -------------------------------------------------- (5) 
where; Pregjt is the proportion of registered worker in industry j and year t and the remaining 
variables are as stated in equation (4). The fixed-effect regression versions of equation (4) are 
weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable.  
Saxonhouse (1976) shows that estimations where the dependent variable is estimated in a first 
step and then regressed against a set of variables intended to explain it, suffer from 
heteroskedasticity because the stochastic term in the first stage is individual specific (in our case, 
industry specific). Similarly, equation (5) is estimated using the share of the industry in the total 
manufacturing employment as weight. Besides this weighting scheme, the standard errors in both 
equations are Huber-White corrected for any other source of general heteroscedasticity. We run 
separate regressions for each trade measure and a joint one with effective tariff, import penetration 
and export orientation; we also include other variables related to the structure of the industry in 
order to test the robustness of the results. These variables are value-added and the proportion of 
workers who earn less than the minimum wage. Additionally, we run one specification adding the 
industry specific nominal exchange rate to the joint specification. The set of regressions also 
contains year dummies aimed at capturing aggregate shocks that may have had some impact on all 
manufacturing industries. 
 
4.   THE SURVEY AREA 
The survey for this study is carried amongst micro and small scale enterprises in Ado Odo/Ota 
Local Government Area of Ogun State. Eighty-five enterprises were visited but only eighty (80) 
responses are obtained from the enterprises, yielding a response rate of 94.1 percent. For the 
employees, 210 questionnaires are administered but only 200 responses are obtained yielding a 
response rate of 95.2 percent. 
 
4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Employers and Workers in the Sampled 
Enterprises 
From the study sample which is 80 enterprises (employers) and 200 employees picked out 
from the 200 enterprises interviewed, some socio-economic characteristics of both the 
entrepreneurs (employers) and employees are explained in Table1. 
 
Table-1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of both Employers and Employees 
Variables Frequency Percentage 
Employers Educational Qualification 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Others  
No response 
 
10 
65 
3 
2 
 
12.5 
81.25  
 3.75 
  2.5 
Total 80 100.0 
Sex of Employees 
Male 
Female 
 
130 
70 
 
65 
35 
Asian Economic and Financial Review, 2013, 3(12):1651-1669 
 
 
 
1661 
 
Total 200 100.0 
Age of Employees 
Less than 20 years 
20-30 years 
31-40 years 
Above 40 years 
 
25 
115 
40 
20 
 
12.5 
57.5 
20 
10 
Total 200 100.0 
Marital Status of Employees 
Single 
Married 
Divorced 
 
140 
50 
10 
 
70 
25 
 5 
Total 200 100.0 
Religion of Employees 
Christianity 
Islam 
 
150 
50 
 
75 
25 
Total 200 100.0 
Nationality of Employees 
Nigerian 
Non-Nigerian 
 
190 
10 
 
95 
 5 
Total 200 100.0 
Educational Qualification of Employees 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Others 
 
30 
60 
85 
25 
 
15 
30  
42.5 
12.5 
Total 200 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
As shown in Table 1, 12.5 percent of the interviewed business owners have secondary school 
education, 85.25 percent of them have tertiary education such as OND, HND, B.Sc, 3.75 percent of 
them have other professional qualifications, while the remaining 2.5 percent did not respond to the 
question. It is noticed that majority of the business owners have education up to the tertiary level 
and this could be linked to the high unemployment rate in Nigeria that led some of them to taking 
up self-employment in the SME sub-sector of the informal economy of Nigeria. All other 
information in the Table can be interpreted in the same manner. 
 
4.2. Types of Enterprises Surveyed and their Characteristics 
The 80 enterprises and 200 employees interviewed are engaged in different economic activities 
in five different types of businesses which are Bread Bakeries, Pure Water businesses, Soap 
Making businesses, Poultry businesses and Printing businesses. The dominant type of business 
among the respondents of this survey is Poultry Farm Businesses in which about 37.5 percent are 
engaged, followed by bread Bakery and Pure Water Making businesses with 18.75 percent 
respondents each, 15 percent in Soap making and the remaining 10 percent are engaged in Printing 
businesses as shown in Table 2. 
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Table-2. Characteristics of Enterprises Surveyed 
Variables Frequency Percentage 
Types of Enterprise 
Bread Bakery 
Pure Water Making 
Soap Making 
Poultry Farm 
Printing Press 
 
15 
15 
12 
30 
  8 
 
18.75 
18.75 
15 
37.5 
10 
Total  80 100.0 
Years of Organisation’s Establishment 
Less than a year 
1-4 years 
5-9 years 
10 years and above 
 
15 
25 
27 
13 
 
18.75 
31.25 
33.75 
16.25 
Total 80 100.0 
Organisation’s Initial Capital 
Less than N49,999 
N50,000-N99,999 
NI00,000-N249,999 
N250,000 and above 
 
15 
34 
20 
11 
 
18.75 
42.5 
25 
13.75 
Total 80 100.0 
Organisation’s Present Capital 
Less than N49,999 
N50,000-N99,999 
NI00,000-N249,999 
N250,000 and above 
 
1 
2 
24 
53                               
 
1.25 
2.5 
30 
66.25 
Total 80 100.0 
Average weekly turnover at Business Start 
Less than N24,999 
N25,000-N49,999 
N50,000-N99,999 
N100,000 and above 
 
51 
16 
10 
3 
 
63.75 
20 
12.5 
 3.75 
Total 80 100.0 
Average weekly turnover now 
Less than N24,999 
N25,000-N49,999 
N50,000-N99,999 
N100,000 and above 
 
4 
25 
30 
21 
 
  5 
31.25 
37.5 
26.25 
Total 80 100.0 
Average profit margin for the first month of Business 
Less than N19,999 
N20,000-N29,999 
N30,000-N49,999 
N50,000 and above 
 
39 
20 
14 
  7 
 
48.75 
25 
17.5 
 8.75 
Total 80 100.0 
Current average profit margin 
 Less than N19,999 
N20,000-N29,999 
N30,000-N49,999 
N50,000 and above 
 
2 
10 
18 
50 
 
  2.5 
12.5 
22.5 
62.5 
Total 80 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
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4.3. Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
The results in Table 3 (see the appendix) suggest that trade liberalization as measured by the 
import penetration ratio had a diminishing effect on the wage differential between registered and 
nonregistered in the manufacturing sector. Overall something between 10 percent and 14 percent of 
the 42 percent decrease in the wage gap in the manufacturing sector can be attributed to the 10 
percent increase in the import penetration ratio observed in the period. As for the other trade 
measures directly affected by the reform, the coefficients for nominal and effective tariff is 
correctly signed as we would expect based on our discussion in the last section, i.e., they have a 
positive impact on the registered workers wage premium, but they are very small and not 
statistically significant. The regressions for the proportion of registered workers in the pool of 
employees were weighted by the share of workers in the industry for each industry/year pair. The 
standard errors are Huber-White corrected. Table 4 shows the results for the fixed effect 
specifications with time dummies. Both effective and nominal tariffs have a negative effect on the 
proportion of registered workers for all specifications, and their coefficients are significant for most 
of them. The coefficients for the import penetration ratio and for the export orientation are not 
significant, but while the import penetration ratio shows a negative impact in most specifications, 
the export orientation has a positive impact in all specifications. The proportion of workers earning 
below the minimum wage is, as expected, negatively correlated with the proportion of registered 
workers. Including the industry-specific exchange rate does not change the coefficient (column [6]) 
of the other variables. 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 (see the appendix) are somewhat puzzling. Whereas the import 
penetration ratio seems to have had a negative impact on the wage differential, it has not affected 
(significantly) the proportion of registered workers, despite its negative sign in most specifications. 
The effective tariff has had no effect on the wage differential (despite its positive sign), but it has 
had a negative impact on the proportion of registered workers. Thus, industries most affected by 
the reduction in effective tariff were the same that witnessed an increase in the proportion of 
registered workers. Therefore, at least for the manufacturing sector, trade liberalisation may have 
had an impact on cutting the wage premia of registered workers, but if anything, it had the effect of 
increasing the proportion of registered workers in the most affected industries. In order to check the 
robustness of these results, allowing for some delay in the adjustments to the new tariffs and to the 
more competitive environment, and also to avoid problems of simultaneity between import 
penetration ratio and export orientation and the wage differential, we re-run equations (4) and (5) 
using lagged regressors rather than contemporaneous. 
As for the results for the wage premium, Table 5 reveals that the main difference is that the 
coefficient of effective tariff is negative in most specifications, but again it is never statistically 
significant. The coefficients of export orientation turn out to be positive for most the fixed-effect 
specifications with time dummies, but they are not significant either. The coefficients for import 
penetration are negative and show a point estimate somewhat higher than the one with 
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contemporaneous effect, ranging from −0.0048 to −0.0064. The inclusion of the lagged industry-
specific exchange rate does not change this result (see column 6). 
In summary, our results suggest among others that trade liberalization had a statistically 
significant negative impact on the reduction of the wage differential between registered and non-
registered workers in the manufacturing sector. However, we do not find evidence of spillover to 
entire economy. 
 
4.4. Main Findings and Discussion 
The major findings of the study are discussed below: 
Firstly, we found evidence that the trade liberalization process is behind the fall in the wage 
gap in the manufacturing sector. It seems that rents that went to registered workers were cut due to 
the more competitive environment in the economy. This result was found in strategy used in this 
study. The strategy used only within-manufacturing industry variation and revealed a negative 
effect of import penetration on the wage gap. 
Secondly, the fall in the proportion of registered workers, however, does not seem to be 
correlated with trade liberalization. The strategy did not yield robust evidence that the trade 
measures were correlated with the fall in the proportion of registered workers. The evidence found 
in the strategy that effective tariff led to an increase in the proportion of registered workers in the 
manufacturing sector was not robust to the use of lagged regressors in the specification with 
additional controls. Similarly, the evidence yielded by the strategy that the increase in the import 
penetration ratio led to a fall in the proportion of registered workers in the entire labour market is 
not robust to the use of lagged regressors. 
Lastly, the study found out that the weak evidence for the effect of trade liberalization on the 
proportion of registered workers suggests that the fall in the proportion of registered workers was 
due to macroeconomic factors or institutional changes that had affected in a homogenous way 
regions and industries within the country. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made: 
Firstly, the Government should encourage the informal sector by providing the needed 
financial and infrastructural facilities to facilitate their smooth operations. If this is done these 
micro enterprises will be able to employ more people and pay the required wages to their 
employees and compete with their counterparts in the advanced countries. 
Secondly, the formal manufacturing sector should also be provided with the necessary 
logistics- in terms of the access to raw materials and infrastructural/social amenities to make their 
operations effective, this way they will be able to employ more and pay commensurate salaries to 
their workers. 
Thirdly, the gap between the wages earned by registered and non-registered workers should be 
narrowed as much as possible. One of the ways to do this is via trade liberalization which opens up 
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the economy to international trade, where informal sector enterprises will be able to export their 
goods and earn income with which they can pay their employees.      
Therefore, based on the findings of this study, we conclude that since the fall in the wage 
differential between registered and non-registered workers as well as the fall in the proportion of 
registered workers are two stylized facts of the Nigerian labour market in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
Government should encourage the informal sector by lending out money to its operators in order to 
be able to set up enterprises that will compete favourably with their counterparts abroad. 
Furthermore, since the wage differential is one of the main determinants of the queue for formal 
jobs, it is reasonable to infer that the size of the queue can be reduced after trade liberalization by 
narrowing of the wage gap between formal and informal workers.  
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Appendix 
 
Table-3. Nominal Tariff and Import Penetration Coefficient (in %) 
 
Source: Researcher’s Computations   Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1% 
Industry and time dummy variables not shown 
Note: As we do not have data on value-added for 1998, specifications that include it have their 
sample size reduced form 170 to 153. 
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Table-4. Regressions for Wage Premium: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies (Contemporaneous 
Regressors) 
 
Source: Researcher’s Computations Robust Standard Errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** 
Significant at 1%. Industry and Time Dummy Variables not shown. Note: As we do not have data 
on value-added for 1998, column [7] specification has only 153 observations. 
 
Table-5. Regression for Wage Premium: Fixed Effect with Time Dummies (Lagged Regressors) 
 
Source: Researcher’s Computations    Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** 
Significant at 1%. Industry and Time Dummy variables not shown. Note: As we do not have data 
on value-added for 1998, column [7] sp 
 
